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Abstract

Wang, Xiaotian. M.S.C.E., Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Wright State University, 2015.
Mission-Aware Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Designing secure cyber-physical systems (CPS) is fundamentally important. An
indispensable step towards this end is to perform vulnerability assessment. This thesis
discusses the design and implementation of a mission-aware CPS vulnerability
assessment framework. The framework intends to accomplish three objectives including
i) mapping CPS mission into infrastructural components, ii) evaluating global impact of
each vulnerability, and iii) achieving verifiable results and high flexibility. In order to
accomplish these objectives, a model-based analysis strategy is employed. Specifically, a
CPS simulator is used to model dynamic behaviors of CPS components under different
missions; the framework facilitates a bottom-up approach to traverse a holistic model of a
CPS that aims at profiling relationships among all CPS components. In order to analyze
the derived models, we have leveraged formal methods, including program symbolic
execution, logic programming, and linear optimization. The framework first successfully
identifies mission-critical components, then discovers all attack paths from system access
points to mission-critical components, and finally recommends the optimized mitigation
plan.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1  

PROBLEM CONTEXT  

  

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) integrates the capabilities of computation,
communication, and control to facilitate seamless interaction between cyber and physical
worlds. Despite the fact that CPSs have been envisioned to revolutionize a wide range of
areas, their practical deployment faces many challenges. Security concerns have been
recognized as one of the most significant obstacles since attackers may tamper with the
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of a CPS in order to cause irrecoverable,
disastrous consequences to cyber systems as well as physical entities. Securing CPSs
therefore becomes fundamentally important.
Mitigating vulnerabilities is essential for CPS security since vulnerabilities have
been considered as the targets for cyber attacks. Ideally, every vulnerability that is
discovered can be mitigated by various means such as testing, software verification, and
vendors’ reporting. However, this ideal solution may suffer from huge practical
limitations. On the one hand, mitigating all vulnerabilities could incur prohibitively high
cost, particularly considering the huge complexity for typical CPSs. On the other hand, it
might actually be unnecessary. For instance, if a vulnerability can never be accessed by
attackers, leaving it unpatched will not affect the security of the CPS at all. Therefore, we
need an effective method that can first assess how each vulnerability impacts the CPS
security and then generate mitigation plans accordingly. However, devising such a
1

method is faced with several significant challenges. First, since CPSs are usually
designed to accomplish certain missions, CPS missions need to be considered into the
loop of vulnerability assessment. To be more specific, a vulnerable component may
impact the same CPS in distinct ways for different missions. For example, if an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is always used for reconnaissance and will never carry
any weapons, then a vulnerability that only impacts the weapon system can be assigned
with low mitigation priority. Second, since a CPS is usually composed of a large number
of networked, interacting components (a.k.a. the system-of-systems nature), the impact
introduced by a vulnerable component might be propagated across or tolerated by the
entire CPS. Therefore, the vulnerability assessment method needs to consider interactions
among all components rather than focusing on individual components. Third, CPSs are
considerably dynamic as a result of redefined missions, added components, and newlydiscovered vulnerabilities. This requires the vulnerability assessment method to be able to
incorporate new knowledge into the analysis process without modifying the analysis
algorithm.
1.2  

THESIS STATEMENT   

1.2.1   Objectives
This thesis is to build a framework capable of performing automated missionaware vulnerability assessment for CPSs by systematically addressing the
aforementioned challenges. Specifically, this framework aims at accomplishing the
following design objectives.
a)   Mapping missions into infrastructural components: given a CPS and its
corresponding mission(s), the framework can automatically identify those
2

components whose proper operations are indispensable for the accomplishment
the CPS mission(s). The components are named as mission-critical components in
this paper.
b)   Evaluating how vulnerabilities impact the entire CPS: given a CPS, its missioncritical components, and interactions among CPS components, the framework can
automatically evaluate how vulnerable components collectively impact the CPS’
mission-critical components.
c)   High verifiability and flexibility: the framework needs to generate verifiable

results. The framework will be sufficiently flexible so that new knowledge of the
studied CPS (e.g., emerging vulnerabilities), which might be represented using
richer semantics, can be incrementally integrated into the analysis process without
modifying the analysis algorithm.
1.2.2   Solutions
In order to accomplish these design objectives, the design follows a modelassisted analysis strategy. This study takes advantage of CPS simulators, which are
typically available for CPS test and verification, to model how CPS components behave
under different missions. A mission is also modeled using a set of values assigned to
relevant program variables of the CPS simulator. As a consequence, mission-critical
components can be identified as those components that will be used by a CPS simulator
given a set of its variable values. In addition, the framework facilitates a bottom-up
approach to traverse a holistic model of a CPS that aims at profiling relationships among
all CPS components. Based on this model, it can iteratively evaluate how each vulnerable
component or a set of vulnerable components affect the performance of other components
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and eventually mission-critical components. This study has employed formal methods
(Clarke & Wing, 1996) to analyze the derived models. Specifically, it has leveraged
symbolic execution (Ou, Govindavajhala, & Appel, 2005) to identify mission-critical
components based on the CPS simulator and mission models. In addition, logic
programming (Clocksin, Mellish, & Clocksin, 1987) is adopted to express the
relationships among all CPS components and impact of each vulnerability. Finally, linear
optimization (Bertsimas, Tsitsiklis , & Tsitsiklis, 1997; Bowen, 1993; Bowen, 1993) has
been adopted to generate mitigation strategies that can protect all mission-critical
components and meanwhile yield minimum cost. The formal method-based design plays
a central role to accomplish the design objectives. On the one hand, the framework
inherits mathematical rigor from the formal methods, rendering results with verifiable
accuracy. On the other hand, the declarative nature of logic programming makes the
framework highly extensible to incorporate new knowledge without modifying the
analysis algorithm. This paper outlines the work-in-progress on this work, illustrates key
techniques used in the framework, and discusses some open challenges and potential
solutions.
1.3  

RELATED WORK

1.3.1   Identifying mission-critical components
A few methods have been proposed (Musman, Tanner, Temin, Elsaesser, & Loren,
2011; Jakobson, 2011) to identify mission-critical components of a complex system.
However, these methods have two significant limitations. First, these methods mainly rely
on manual efforts to perform analysis, which is time-consuming and error-prone. Second,
the built system dependency description is static and thus fails to characterize the dynamic
4

behaviors of the system. For example, the Crown Jewels Analysis method (Musman,
Tanner, Temin, Elsaesser, & Loren, 2011) leverages the dependency maps, which are
manually constructed, to associate mission objectives with cyber assets (e.g., the
components).
1.3.2   Discovering attack paths in computer networks
A few methods (Sheyner & Wing, 2004; Ou, Boyer, & McQueen, 2006; Ou,
Govindavajhala, & Appel, 2005) have been proposed to evaluate software vulnerabilities
in computer networks by identifying attack paths. Similar to this framework, those
approaches also employ formal methods. Sheyner et. al. used model checking (2004) and
Ou et. al. adopted logic programming (2005; 2006). In spite of the similarity, the
framework in this study differs from those methods in several ways. First, existing
methods have not considered mission contexts in the assessment loop. Second, compared
to existing methods that extensively concentrate on profiling the consequence of software
vulnerabilities, this framework incorporates richer semantics such as the impacts
introduced by data integrity and physical interference. Finally, unlike existing methods
that require significant modification of the program interpreters, this study takes
advantage of the built-in features of the programming language, which implies higher
compatibility and lower maintenance cost.

5

Chapter 2
Technical Background of Formal Methods
Our model-based analysis method extensively leverages formal methods. Formal
methods are techniques and tools used to model complex software and hardware systems
as mathematical entities. With the mathematically rigorous model of a complex system, a
system’s properties can be verified in a more thorough fashion than empirical testing.
Specifically, the mathematical rigor of formal methods requires all the statements in this
methodology to be well-formed with mathematical logic. Formal verifications are
rigorously deducted from that logic, which means each step has to follow a rule of
inference and can be checked through a mechanical process (Kling, 1996). This
framework involves two types of formal methods, including symbolic execution (King,
1976) and logic programming (Sterling & Shapiro, 1994).
2.1  

SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
Symbolic execution is a formal method-based technique that is extensively used

for static program analysis. It can represent the input of a program as symbolic variables
and the program will execute symbolically instead of using concrete values of the input.
As a result, each path of the program will be associated with a constraint that has to be
satisfied to make the path executable. The constraint can be derived from the input
symbolic variables (Boyer, Elspas, & Levitt., 1975).
In Figure 1, an example illustrates the functionality of symbolic execution, and
how executable paths are discovered based on user-defined symbolic variables. When a
variable is set up as a symbolic value, it will be calculated by a constraint solver to check
whether it can satisfy the symbolic constraint at each branching point or not. If there is at
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least one feasible solution, the symbolic execution will continue to discover further
paths along current branching point. Otherwise the execution will stop on the current path
and recursively work on next available path until all paths are analyzed (Cadar, Dunbar,
& Engler, 2008; King, 1975). In this example program, integer variables x, y and z are
assigned as symbolic values. Without the assumptions of the variables, they could be any
integers during symbolic execution. For instance, the first branching point, the “Path 1”
can be satisfied if x is an integer that is bigger than zero. Four paths can be discovered
without assumptions. If the user assumes x is less than or equal to zero, y is less than or
equal to 10, and z is greater than zero, the constraints of “Path 1” and “Path 2” can not be
satisfied.

Figure 1 A symbolic execution example

Therefore, only “Path 3” and “Path 4” are executable with the assumptions, and functions
including ‘print (“Branch 1 – False”)’, ‘print (“Branch 2 – False”)’, ‘print (“Branch 3 –
7

True”)’ and ‘print (“Branch 3 – False”)’ are associated with the symbolic constraint
“x<=0 ∧ y<=10 ∧ z>0”.
In this study, in order to identify mission-critical components and decrease the
size of symbolic execution space, the specific mission assigns assumptions for the input
variables of UAV simulator. Similar to the example in Figure 1, only executable paths
and functions can be discovered and associated with its constraint, accordingly the
corresponding components are identified as mission-critical components.
2.2  

LOGIC PROGRAMMING
Logic programming is a declarative programming paradigm based on logical

formulas. Prolog is a well-known implementation in the logic programming language
family. An executable Prolog program normally consists of three parts including rules,
facts and queries. A rule is a semantic representation written in the form of clauses, such
as “Head: - Body”. This can be understood as “If the Body is true, then the Head is true”.
It is a proposition which can be true or false depending on the facts. A fact is a special
case of rules in which its Body is always true, so the facts are true.
Figure 1 presents an example of a Prolog program. Specifically, “David is the
father of Solomon” and “Solomon is the father of Rehoboam” refer to facts, respectively.
One rule is defined as “if A is the father of B and B is the father of C, then A is the
grandfather of C”. The query is expressed as “Who is the grandfather of Rehoboam?” and
it is worth noting that “Who” (starting with capital “W”) represents a variable. A Prolog
interpreter can analyze the facts and perform automatic inference based on the given rules
and queries automatically. In this particular example, the Prolog interpreter will identify
the value (i.e., “david”) for the variable “Who” (Sterling  &  Shapiro,  1994).     
8

Figure 2 How does the Prolog run? - An example of a Prolog program

For the purpose of searching in a knowledge base, a bottom-up or a top-down
approach can be utilized to achieve a goal. The top-down approach starts processing
information from the top of a predefined data structure to the bottom, but the bottom-up
approach searches in the opposite way. To be more specific, the following example
illustrates the difference between the top-down and bottom-up approach.

Figure 3 The bottom-up approach V.S. the top-down approach - A family tree
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The Figure 3 presents a family tree that can be read as “a” is the father of “b”, “b” is the
father of “c”, “d”, and “e”, and so on. Depending on these relations, if more semantic
information is desired, the appropriate traversal strategy has to be defined. For instance, a
query “Who is in the list of g’s predecessor?” can be asked. A top-down approach will
traverse from “a” to “f”, from “a” to “g”, and from “a” to “h”, then the answer can be
found. In this way, two redundant lists are discovered. However, the bottom-up approach
can be facilitated to only generate desired answer. In Figure 4, both approaches are coded
into a Prolog program.

Figure 4 The coded bottom-up and top-down approaches in a Program program
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The query guided by bottom-up approach achieves one desired list. Obviously the
answers in Figure 5 demonstrate the bottom-up approach is more effective in this specific
query.

Figure 5 The queries and answers based on bottom-up and tom-down approaches

Since the CPS’s infrastructure model in this framework is transformed into a
similar data structure, a bottom-up approach is facilitated to traverse a holistic model of a
CPS that aims at profiling relationships among all CPS components. For instance, if the
component a is a access point1 and the component g is the target component2 that the
attacker wants to compromise, then the bottom-up approach discovers attack paths
starting from the target component g up to the access point component a. Since the
component h and f are not targets, traversing on them is wasting time. The bottom-up
approach avoids traversing irrelevant paths in order to reduce the running time. In the
meantime, the Prolog’s backtracking mechanism guarantees that this approach can find
all potential attack paths for the target component.

1
2

The “Access point” in Figure 15 of Section 3.4.
The “Component A” in Figure 15 of Section 3.4.

11

Chapter 3
The Mission-aware Vulnerability CPS Assessment Framework
3.1  

ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

CPS Simulator

Mission-Critical
Components

Mapping Mission
into Infrastructure

Mission Description

Vulnerabilities to
Mitigate
Prioritize Mitigation
Plans

Local Views of
Components

Discovering Attack
Paths

(Vulnerability, Data
Dependency…)

Attack Paths

Figure 6 The framework’s architectural overview

The architectural overview of this framework is presented in Figure 6. It takes the
CPS simulator and the profile of each component as inputs. The input characterizes its
internal security states and interactions with its neighbor components. The first phase of
this framework aims at mining all mission-critical components. The second phase
integrates the profile of each individual component and assesses how vulnerable
components collectively disrupt mission-critical components. To be more specific, it
discovers all potential attack paths, where each attack path represents a sequence of
actions an attacker can take (e.g., exploiting a vulnerability) in order to affect the
mission-critical components and ultimately disrupt the CPS’ mission. Finally, given the
cost to mitigate each vulnerable component, this framework will identify a set of
vulnerable components to mitigate so that it can protect all mission-critical components
while incurring minimum cost.

12

3.2   CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
3.2.1   Cyber-physical system (CPS)
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) integrates computational elements, networking
components, and physical processes. Salient examples of CPSs, include, but are not
limited to, cardiac pacemakers, insulin pumps, automobiles with anti-lock braking system
(ABS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Different from traditional computing
systems such as personal computers, a CPS is usually characterized by its systems-ofsystems nature, (Lee, 2008), where a collection of (autonomous) components collaborate
and interact to accomplish specific missions. This results in significant challenges for
vulnerability assessment. Specifically, it is insufficient to assess vulnerabilities on each
individual component. Instead, effective assessment needs to characterize the interaction
of all components. In addition, missions have to be considered.
For example, an automobile usually consists of an embedded central controller, a
speed sensor, an anti-lock braking system, a GPS, as well as a pump and a valve for
monitoring and controlling the speed of the car. The central controller monitors the speed
sensor at all times. If an out of ordinary deceleration is detected right before a wheel
locks up, the wheel will be stopped quickly. The speed sensor and central controller may
also interact with the GPS. If this car is a military vehicle and carries an automatic
weapon system controlled by the central controller, it might be employed for a particular
mission.
From the security perspective, vulnerabilities might exist on individual
components, and might also exist on services between any two components. For instance,
malicious users may have opportunities to compromise the central controller and GPS, in
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order to disable the ABS during an anti-lock braking process. If a malicious user can
achieve those successfully, there might exist attack paths from one component all the way
down to the braking system. For particular missions, the weapon systems also have to be
considered into the vulnerability assessment. However, if the weapon system will not be
invoked in a mission, it will not affect the security of this CPS in this mission.

3.2.2   Mission
A mission is a specific job or task which should be accomplished by the CPS.
e.g., a UAV that takes 10 pictures at certain address. One challenge of this study is how
to quantify a mission for a CPS. In the UAV case study, a mission is represented as a set
of values which can be used as inputs for the UAV simulator. More details about
missions can be found in Section 3.3.

3.2.3   Vulnerability
In a CPS, a vulnerability is a weakness or a flaw which can be used by malicious
users to compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of the CPS (Microsoft,
2015). In this study, vulnerabilities can reside in services that are among components. In
the automobile example, a malicious user might have an attack path from a GPS to a
central unit, and from the central unit to a weapon system by compromising
vulnerabilities among these components.

3.2.4   Service
The interaction among multiple components can be characterized as services. In
this framework, we consider two types of services: the control service and the data
service. Control services can direct behaviors from one component to another. In Figure
7, a central processing unit sends a signal to turn on the camera. From the central
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processing unit to the camera, there exists a control service. The data service can
transfer information from one component to another, e.g., a temperature sensor can
transfer temperature information to the central processing unit for calculation or to the
database for storage. From a program analysis perspective, a service can be seen as a
function or a module in a program which will be called by other components.

Figure 7 Services and components in a CPS

3.2.5  

Component

Any constituent element of a system should be considered as a component. The
case study of a UAV in this thesis has a rough scope to define a component, so a few
small components might be abstracted into single one. In this way, one component might
have multiple services. However, the semantic meaning of the abstract model of the UAV
will not be changed.
The UAV example in Figure 8 illustrates how the components are located on a
UAV. Combining this with the UAV simulator, it can be abstracted into a model in
Figure 9.

15

Figure 8 The components on a example UAV CPS (UAVOS Company, 2014)

Figure 9 The abstracted model of the UAV’s services and components
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In Figure 9, only control and data services that exist among components are
displayed. The physical impacts are also available among components in this study. Each
component has its corresponding coordination on the UAV, from which the distance
between two components can be calculated. When two components are physically close
enough, one may affect another’s functionality significantly. For example, if a GPS is
over-heating and is close enough to a camera, and the camera is sensitive to high
temperature, then the camera’s capability may be undermined. A malicious user might
take advantage of this interference to cause a failure of a mission.

3.2.6   Mission-critical component
As long as the component supports functionality to this mission and its failure
will lead the mission failure or degradation, it will be considered as mission-critical
component (DoD, 2013). For instance, if a camera on a UAV will be invoked in a
mission, this camera must be one of the mission-critical components, since its damage or
inaccuracy of its behavior may cause the failure of the mission.
3.3  

MAPPING MISSION INTO INFRASTRUCTURE
In this thesis, a component is defined as mission-critical if it is used by the CPS to

carry out a mission. Intuitively, if a mission-critical component malfunctions, the mission
is highly likely to be disrupted. The objective of this phase is to discover all missioncritical components given a CPS simulator and the description of the mission(s). To this
end, missions will be considered from a programmer’s perspective, where a mission is
corresponding to a set of values assigned to certain program variables of the CPS
simulator. As a consequence, mission-critical components are identified as those
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components that will be invoked by the CPS simulator given a set of values assigned to
certain program variables.
The program variables for a CPS simulator can be generally categorized into two
classes, namely the configuration parameters and the sensing signals. A configuration
parameter refers to a parameter that is set by the CPS operator for a specific mission. In
other words, the values of the configuration parameters are known before hand. In
contrast, the value for a sensing-signal parameter can only be acquired at runtime.
Consequently, all acceptable values are considered for sensing signal parameters.
Given program variables and their values, a straightforward approach to identify
mission-critical components is to exhaustively execute the CPS simulator with all
possible assigned values for all the program variables. Despite its simplicity, this
approach may incur prohibitively high computation cost since all potential values for a
set of program variables are likely to result in an enormous number of testing executions.
The program symbolic execution (King, 1976) is adopted to address this
challenge. Specifically, this framework will first execute the CPS simulator symbolically.
Each component in the simulator will be associated with a symbolic constraint, where a
symbolic constraint is expressed by a collection of program variables (i.e., configuration
parameters and sensing signals). A component will be invoked if any combination of the
variable values make its associated constraint satisfied. To automate the satisfiability
investigation process, a constraint solver is leveraged (e.g., a Satisfiability Modulo
Theories solver). A pseudo-code snippet of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simulator
presented in Figure 10 is used to demonstrate the design of this framework.

18

Figure 10 The code snippet of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) CPS

The corresponding control flow graph and symbolic constraints of paths are displayed in
Figure 11.

Figure 11 Control flow graph and constraints of execution paths
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The function start_camera(int x, int y) is used to start the proper camera
for the UAV based on the current coordinate of the UAV (i.e., x and y). Specifically, if
the optical visibility is low (i.e., the “optic_sensor()” returns “true”), then the UAV
will use its infrared camera (i.e., “IR_camera()”). Otherwise, it will use a high
resolution optical camera or a regular optical camera. If the UAV flies over an adversarial
area, which is defined by “x_low”, “x_high”, “y_low”, and “y_high”, it will use
the high resolution camera (i.e., “hi_res_camera()”); otherwise, it will use a regular
optical camera (i.e., “regular_camera()”). This study considers the scenario in
which the adversarial area is stable. Therefore, the programming variables of this
framework’s concern include “x”, and “y”. For a specific mission, the UAV operator will
assign values for “x” and “y”. Comparatively, “is_low_visiability” will be
initialized by the optical sensor at runtime.
Three missions are placed for the UAV, each mission representing a rectangular
reconnaissance area. Each area is defined by the possible values for both “x” and “y”,
which are illustrated in Table 1 and further visualized in Figure 12. Since
“is_low_visiability” is a sensing-signal variable, all possible values (i.e., “true”
and “false”) are provided. The advantage of using symbolic execution to identify
mission-critical components becomes evident in this example. If the exhaustive execution
strategy is followed, a large number of 9001×9001×2 execution paths are needed to
explore all possible values for three variables. Comparatively, the symbolic execution
technique adopted by this framework executes this program, and the build-in solver
exams the three constraints (e.g., C1, C2, and C3 in Table 2) for three camera
components, respectively, whether they can be satisfied by using the given symbolic

20

values “x” and “y” or not. Table 3 presents the decisions from a constraint solver
which depends on the predefined symbolic values and possible values for
“is_low_visiability” generated by the build-in solver as shown in Table 2.

Mission 3

Adversarial Area

y

Mission 2
Mission 1

x
Figure 12 Missions example

Mission  

x's  range  

y's  range  

Mission  1  

x  ∈  [0,  9000]  

y  ∈  [0,  9000]  

Mission  2   x  ∈  [12500,  15000]   y  ∈  [12500,  15000]  
Mission  3   x  ∈  [19000,  25000]   y  ∈  [19000,  25000]  
Table 1 Configuration for three missions

Component  

Constraint  

Notation  

IR_camera()  

is_low_visiability  

C1  

hi_res_camera()  

x  ∈  [10000,  20000]  ∧  y  ∈  [10000,  20000]  ∧  ¬  is_low_visibility  

C2  

regular_camera()   ¬(x  ∈  [10000,  20000]  ∧  y  ∈  [10000,  20000])  ∧  ¬  is_low_visibility  
Table 2 The constraint for each function

C1   C2   C3  

Critical  Components  

Mission  1   Y   N   Y  

IR_camera()  and  regular_camera()  

Mission  2   Y   Y   N  

IR_camera()  and  hi_res_camera()  

Mission  3   Y   Y   Y   IR_camera(),  regular_camera(),  and  hi_res_camera()  
Table 3 Constraints satisfied for each mission
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C3  

If a constraint of an execution path can be satisfied, its corresponding component will
be invoked by the CPS system and therefore becomes the critical component. For
example, since only C1 and C3 can be satisfied for Mission 1, “IR_camera()” and
“regular_camera()” will be labeled as mission-critical functions, and its
corresponding components are mission-critical components.

Figure 13 The overview and call graph of the instrumented KLEE
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The KLEE (Cadar, Dunbar, & Engler, 2008; Baral & Gelfond, 1994), a symbolic
virtual machine, is currently instrumented to implement this phase of this framework.
Specifically, this framework augments KLEE so that it can label functions that represent
CPS components. The instrumented KLEE can automatically collect constraints for each
labeled function and subsequently perform verification using its built-in constraint solver.
Figure 13 illustrates how the labeled functions which represent CPS components can be
traversed and collected during symbolic execution.

Figure 14 Code snippet of instrumented functions of KLEE
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The inter-procedure call graph of instrumented KLEE illustrates how exactly the labelled
function names are printed out from the entry point of the KLEE symbolic execution
engine. In the instrumented KLEE, a list “function_names” that stores labelled
function names is created and updated during symbolic execution process. In the call
graph, some functions of KLEE are modified to fulfill the purpose of this framework.
Two major instrumented functions are listed in Figure 14. The first modified function of
KLEE is in charge of collecting each labelled functions name of CPS when each of them
is invoked in an instruction. The second one is responsible of outputting the names of
labelled functions in order to identify the corresponding mission-critical components.
Accordingly, the mission is mapped into the infrastructure of the abstracted model of a
CPS.
3.4  

MINING ATTACK PATHS
After the mission-critical components have been identified, this framework

evaluates how vulnerable components can collectively impact the mission-critical
components. This thesis aims at discovering all attack paths that can lead an attacker
from exploiting one or multiple access points to disrupting a mission-critical component
via a sequence of malicious actions (e.g., exploiting security vulnerabilities). This
framework aims at facilitating users toward following a bottom-up strategy to discovery
attack paths.3 Components are first individually characterized and then aggregated for

3

The general idea of bottom-up strategy is demonstrated in Section 2.2.
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holistic analysis. The current model profiles a CPS from the following two
perspectives: internal security states and their relationships.
An attacker’s privilege has been widely used by existing network-based
vulnerability assessment methods (Sheyner & Wing, 2004; Ou, Govindavajhala, &
Appel, 2005; Ou, Boyer, & McQueen, 2006) to represent security states of a computing
node. Such representation reflects the consequence of successfully exploiting a software
vulnerability (e.g., a buffer overflow vulnerability). However, it becomes insufficient for
CPS vulnerability assessment since actions an attacker can take to disrupt a CPS mission
are no longer limited by exploiting software vulnerabilities. For example, a missioncritical component, which is sensitive to high temperature, could be physically interfered
with by another component, which is instructed by an attacker to generate an extensive
amount of heat. In response, three types of security states are considered which include
adversarial privilege, data integrity, and physical safety.
Similar to existing methods, the adversarial privilege state indicates the attacker’s
privilege, such as the typical “USER” or “ROOT” privilege. Comparatively, the new
states, data integrity and physical safety, demonstrate the trustworthiness of the generated
data and the physical condition, respectively. Since the internal states might not be
independent, how an internal state affects another within a component is also
characterized. For example, an attacker who obtains “ROOT” privilege on a component
can contaminate its data integrity. Interactions with Other Components. The internal
states of a component could be affected by other components. For example, if a
component A takes output from another component B as its input and B’s data is
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contaminated by the attacker, then A’s data integrity will be effected and its missions
are highly likely to be subsequently disrupted.
Similar scenarios are applicable to those components that interfere with each
other physically. Vulnerable services can also serve as stepping stones for an attacker to
gain privilege on a component from its victimized neighbor.
The BProlog (Zhou, 2014) language is adopted, a popular logic programming
(Clocksin, Mellish, & Clocksin, 1987) language, to express the model and implement the
analysis algorithm. The Prolog-based implementation builds two important features into
this framework. First, the declarative nature of Prolog facilitates us to incorporate new
semantics (e.g., semantics to describe physical safety with finer granularity) into the
model. Second, the method in this framework generates verifiable, accurate results due to
BProlog’s optimized design for exhaustive search (i.e., it can reveal all attack paths).

Component A
Data
Dependency

Data
Dependency

Component B
Vulnerable
Service (V1)

Vulnerable Component C
Service (V1)
Heat
Interference

Component D

Component E

Access Point (V2)

Access Point (V2)

Figure 15 Modeling an example CPS

It is worth noting that this implementation takes advantage of language-level
features of Prolog rather than manipulating its internal implementation to produce attack
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paths (Sheyner & Wing, 2004; Ou, Boyer, & McQueen, 2006; Ou, Govindavajhala, &
Appel, 2005). As a result, this implementation can naturally benefit from the evolution of
Prolog interpreters such as the integration of distributed or parallel computing
infrastructures (Côrte-Real, Dutra, & Rocha, 2013), implying low engineering and
maintenance cost in the practical deployment.
Similar to Figure 7, Figure 15 represents a fraction of a CPS to illustrate the
design of this framework, where the relationships among components are annotated in it.
For example, the component A relies on the output from both B and C for operation; B
offers a vulnerable service to D; C’s operation can be interfered with by high temperature
from E. In Figure 16, the Prolog code presents the Prolog-based model of this UAV CPS
example. “PART 1 – Facts” of the code refers to the structure of the CPS and the
vulnerabilities of the system, which are presented as Prolog “facts;” “PART 2 – Rules”
describes the impact of vulnerabilities, data dependency and physical interferences,
which are presented as Prolog “rules.” Rules can either be applicable for a specific
component (e.g., line 12 - 14) or all components (e.g., line 15 - 36). A Prolog rule is a
Horn clause represented as “H ∶- B1, B2, ..., Bn”, which means that “if B1, B2, ...and Bn are
all true, then H is true”. In the context of vulnerability assessment, B1, B2, ...and Bn
indicate the conditions necessary for an attacker manipulate internal security states of a
component; H indicates the consequence of the manipulation. For instance, line 23 - 26
means that the data integrity of a component (denoted by the variable Target) is
compromised if this component has data dependency on another component (denoted by
the variable Source) which means Source’s data integrity has been contaminated. It is
worth noting that Prolog’s backtracking mechanism is leveraged to discover attack paths.
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The backtracking mechanism is for finding all answers for a query. In this example,
“Path” in line 25 indicates the attack path that lead to the data damage on the Source
component and “[(Target, ‘data-dependency’) | Path]” recursively attach the current
vulnerability to the head of the attack path.

Figure 16 An illustrative model - Prolog Code

28

Figure 17 Query and answer

In order to discover all attack paths, a user can first define the disruption state for
a mission-critical component and execute a query. For example, if define the disruption
of the component A as the violation of its data integrity, then a user can execute the query
“data_damage(a, Path)”, where Path is a variable that contains all attack paths. In this
specific example, Path contains the attack paths which are shown in Figure 17. The
second path is
“Access Point -v2→ Com. D -v1→ Com. B -root-data→ Com. B -data-depen.→ Com. A”

3.5  

OPTIMIZING MITIGATION PLANS
In this phase, the objective of this framework is to identify a set of vulnerable

components so that mitigating them can i) protect all mission-critical components from
being disrupted and ii) minimize the mitigation cost. The discovered attack paths with
100% coverage in the previous phase greatly facilitate the mitigation process. If
mitigating a set of vulnerable components can block all attack paths, then all missioncritical components will be protected. Hence, this framework formulates this problem
based on the derived attack paths. The variable 𝑣# is used to denote a vulnerable
component and variable 𝑐%& represents the cost to mitigate this vulnerability. Each attack
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path (e.g., pk) is represented by a set of its composing vulnerable components (i.e.,
(
𝑝( = {𝑣+
, 𝑣-( , … , 𝑣/( }). The P is used to represent all attack paths, where P = {p1, p2, ...,

pm}. The V is used to denote a set of vulnerable components selected for mitigation. A
function, namely count(p), is introduced to count the number of vulnerable components
to be mitigated in an attack path p, where count(𝑝( ) = |	
  {	
  𝑝( ∩ V } ∣. Then, the objective
of this phase can be formulated as an optimization problem described as follows: 	
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This is a typical linear optimization problem and the BProlog’s build-in solver is
leveraged to seek a feasible optimum solution for the mitigation plans.
3.6  

GRAPHIC USER INTERFACE
In order to improve the usability and flexibility, a graphic user interface (GUI) is

designed to integrate the functionalities of this framework. This interface facilitates that a
user can easily extend the knowledge base of the infrastructure and the vulnerabilities of
CPS without modifying the reasoning strategy. Five sections including configuration
editor, component editor, trust relation editor, access point editor and service editor are
employed to read infrastructure information from the user. The vulnerability editor
section reads the details of each vulnerability from the user. The configuration editor is
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used to describe the services and relationships among components.

Figure 18 Configuration editor screenshot

In Figure 18, the first row on the table can be read as there exists a service s1 from
component b4 to component b2, and the service s1 has a vulnerability v1. The service
editor can read service description from the user. (e.g., s1 is SMTP service which has an
opening port 25). Similar to the service editor, the component editor records the
component’s description, the services running on it, and its trusting components.

Figure 19 Component editor screenshot

In Figure 19, component b2 is a MODEM that has three services including s4, s1, and s6.
The trusting relation can be defined by the trust relation editor in Figure 20.

Figure 20 Trust relation editor screenshot
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The first row of the trust relation table represents that if a user achieves USER privilege
on component b2, then he or she can immediately get USER privilege on b5 by this host
trust relation.

Figure 21 Access point editor screenshot

Users can also assume the access points of a system in the access point editor. In Figure
21, the user assumes that a malicious employee could achieve USER privilege on
component b4, if and only if when this employee has USER privilege in this system. All
above editors are designed to build up and extend the infrastructure of a system. The
vulnerability editor allows the vulnerability to be integrated into the analysis process. In
Figure 20, the user inserted a vulnerability v1 that can be compromised by the malicious
users to achieve a USER privilege if he or she already had GUEST privilege. In the
configuration editor, a vulnerability can be attached to its corresponding services.

Figure 22 Vulnerability editor screenshot
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The cost of mitigating each vulnerability can be defined by the user. It is used to
determine the minimum cost mitigation plan. For example, in Figure 22, to mitigate a
vulnerability v1 requires 4 units cost.

Figure 23 Control panel screenshot

Figure 24 Visualized system configuration and attack paths
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Once all infrastructure and vulnerability information is inserted into this framework, the
user can choose the mission and run analyzer to achieve the results. In this demo, two
missions are pre-defined to illustrate the design idea4. After clicking the “Run Analyzer”
button in Figure 23, the visualized system configuration is displayed on the output panel.
In Figure 24, the system configuration illustrates the same abstracted model as the UAV
model in Figure 27. The attack paths are displayed at bottom of Figure 24. This interface
also output the optimized mitigation plan(s) if there exists at least one feasible solution.
Based on the cost assumption (e.g., random integers between 0 and 10) in this study, one
feasible optimum solution is achieved by the build-in solver of BProlog in Figure 25.
Patching vulnerabilities v2 and v5 is the minimum cost mitigation plan that needs 8 units
cost. This mitigation plan can destroy all existing attack paths.

Figure 25 Optimized mitigation plan screenshot

4

These two missions can be found in Section 3.7.1.
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The panoramic screenshot of this interface is displayed in Figure 26. Cooperating with
this GUI benefits the user to build up and enrich the infrastructure information and
achieve desired results without worries about the underlying technologies.

Figure 26 Panoramic screenshot of GUI

3.7  

FRAMEWORK EVALUATION

3.7.1   Effectiveness
A UAV simulator has been build to evaluate the vulnerability assessment
framework. The simulator, written in C++, represents the integration of the interacting
components. It can be abstracted into a model which is illustrated in Figure 27. Its proper
operation relies on both the configuration parameters and sensing signals. The
configuration parameters describe the cruise routes of the UAV and adversarial areas; the
sensing signals capture the weather conditions, which are randomly generated during the
simulation. Different components will be used when the combination of the current
35

position of the UAV, its associated adversarial status, and the weather condition. The
route map and mission list can be found in Figure 28.

Figure 27 Model of the UAV simulator

Figure 28 Missions and route map for the UAV simulator
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A mission is associated with a set of possible values for both the cruise route and the
coordinates of adversarial areas; all possible values are assigned to each sensing signal
variable. In Table 4 and 5, the input values of missions can be found for both Route 1 and
2. The assume ranges of coordinates for Position 2, 3, 4, and 5 are also listed in Table 4
and 5.
Position No.

Latitude

Longitude

Altitude

1

397589478

-841916069

225

2

396894936 < v0_0 < 396895136

-841688374 < v0_1 < -841688174

296 < v0_2 < 316

3

396283828 < v1_0 < 396284028

-841593918 < v1_1 < -841593718

301 < v1_2 < 321

4

394508837 < v2_0 < 394509037

-840960552 < v2_1 < -840960352

202 < v2_2 < 222

5

394353273 < v3_0 < 394353473

-842030022 < v3_1 < -842029822

224 < v3_2 < 244

6

393120031

-842829935

247

7

391908926

-843635507

233

8

391644798

-844542798

186

9

391031182

-845120196

167

Table 4 Coordinates of route 1
Position No.

Latitude

Longitude

1

397589478

-841916069

Altitude
225

2

396722712 < v0_0 < 396722912

-842521732 < v0_1 < -842521532

208 < v0_2 < 228

3

395786685 < v1_0 < 395786885

-842979273 < v1_1 < -842979073

196 < v1_2 < 216

4

394928267 < v2_0 < 394928467

-842896714 < v2_1 < -842896514

258 < v2_2 < 278

5

393600486 < v3_0 < 393600686

-843099490 < v3_1 < -843099290

236 < v3_2 < 256

6

393120031

-842829935

247

7

391908926

-843635507

233

8

391644798

-844542798

186

9

391031182

-845120196

167

Table 5 Coordinates of route 2

The instrumented KLEE is used to identify all mission-critical components given a
mission description and the the Prolog-based analysis engine subsequently enumerate all
attack paths. While this framework by design inherits the mathematical rigor of SAT and
Prolog, the manual analysis further verified that all mission-critical components and
attack paths were correctly identified. All critical functions and critical components have
been identified successfully which are listed in Table 6. After critical components are
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identified, attack paths can be found by the Prolog program of this framework. The
attack paths and corresponding vulnerability set are listed in Figure 29.
Route 2 Mission-Critical Functions

Route 1 Mission-Critical Functions

(passive_antenna).

(engine_mode_normal).

(passive_antenna).

(engine_mode_normal).

(radio_modem).

(engine_voltage_sensor).

(bluetooth_signal).

(engine_voltage_sensor)

(bluetooth_signal).

(magnetometer).

(klee_assume).

(magnetometer).

(klee_assume).

(klee_div_zero_check).

(accZ).

(gps).

(accZ).

(gps).

(accY).

(gps_magnetometer).

(accY).

(gps_magnetometer)

(solar_energy_off).

(speed_detector).

(solar_energy_off).

(speed_detector).

(roll).

(system_voltage_sensor).

(roll).

(claw_engine).

(accX).

(yaw).

(accX).

(system_voltage_sensor).

(klee_make_symbolic).

(turn_off_Camera).

(radio_decoder).

(radar_dish_engine).

(solar_energy_on).

(camera_remote_off).

(klee_make_symbolic).

(yaw).

(weather_detector).

(accelerometer).

(radar_processor).

(puts).

(gyroscope_sensor).

(engine_mode_APBOX).

(ground_defense_signal)

(radar).

(normal_shutter).

(camera_remote_on).

(solar_energy_on).

(gyroscope_sensor).

(memcpy).

(pitch).

(accelerometer).

(memcpy).

(turn_off_night_mode).

(turn_on_Camera).

(engine_mode_APBOX).

(radio_battery_control).

(static_press._sensor).

(gps_STM32_microcontroll
er).

(pitch).

(backup_battery).

(circling).

(radio_signal).

(unloading).

(radio_wave_generator).

(moveTo).

(gps_1).

(puts).

(is_night_mode).

(gps_STM32_microcontroll
er)
(time).
(gps_1).

(static_pressure_sensor).

(circling).

(radio_analog_sensor).

(moveTo).

(rand).

(weather_detector).

(srand).

(pick_up).
Route 2 Mission-Critical Components

Route 1 Mission-Critical Components

[apbox, cas, claw, gps, modem]

[apbox, camera, cas, gps, modem]

[b1, b2, b3, b4]
[b1, b2, b4, b5]
Table 6 Critical functions and components generated by instrumented KLEE

38

Figure 29 Critical components and attack paths

3.7.2   Performance
The performance of finding attack paths by BProlog in this study has not
encountered scalability issues. However, experiments that are more complicated are
tested for evaluating the framework’s scalability.

Figure 30 The example topology of testing cases
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Test experiments are generated for testing the scalability of finding attack paths
using the same bottom-up traversal algorithm. The sample topology is displayed in
Figure 30. In this figure, an employee has the capability to compromise the target through
an attack path, “Employee”, “b0_0”, “b1_0”, “b1_1” and “Target.”

Figure 31 Number of attack paths for the scalability experiments

Figure 32 Running time of finding attack paths for the scalability experiments
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As the number of nodes increases, the number of paths increases exponentially, which
is shown in Figure 31. In order to demonstrate the number of vulnerabilities on
components may also affect the scalability. The comparable experiments are created, so
the number of vulnerable service is decreased in each topology by 10%, 20%, and so on.
For example, there are 100 components in a topology. This topology with 10%
vulnerability services represents that 10 of the 100 components contain vulnerable
services. This decreasing strategy is also applied in the running time experiments. For
instance, the left-most curve in Figure 31 represents that the number of attack paths
increases significantly with the size of graph increases. Its topology contains 90%
vulnerable services. The left-most curve in Figure 32 is the corresponding running time.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and Further Work
This framework has systematically integrated program symbolic execution, logic
programming, and linear optimization in order to perform mission-aware CPS
vulnerability assessment. Despite the fact that this framework has demonstrated high
accuracy and automaticity, a few open challenges have been observed. The discovery of
mission-critical components will face great challenges if a CPS simulator yields complex
constraints (e.g., sophisticated arithmetic constraints) that stay beyond the capabilities of
constraint solvers. In response, a few solutions can be considered. First, if complex
constraints involve a small number of variables that have small value spaces, this
framework can still adopt execution-based approach. Second, domain knowledge (e.g.,
the relationships among variables) might be used to simply the model (e.g., reducing the
value space for sensing signal sensors). For example, if an UAV takes a certain route for
a mission, the wind speed might fall into a small range. In addition, the evolving
techniques can be adopted for constraint solvers. Despite the fact that this framework
offers high flexibility to incorporate richer semantics, exploiting such potential highly
desires an interactive model development environment that can facilitate i) the
communications among users responsible for different CPS components and ii) the
sharing of rules applicable for multiple components. For example, if more fine grained
security states are desired for a component, other relevant components need to be notified
to redefine their relationships based on new states.
Model-driven design is gaining increasing popularity in building safety critical
systems including CPS. Several languages have been defined to model various systems
such as Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Warmer & Kleppe, 1999) and Architecture
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Analysis & Design Language (AADL) (Feiler, Gluch, & Hudak, 2006) . How to extend
this framework so that it can perform automated analysis using models in described in
these languages is an area for the future work.
The solution to mitigation optimization focuses on reducing the cost of
mitigations. However, more factors may influence the mitigation decisions. The
likelihood for a vulnerable component to be taken advantage of by attackers is among the
most important factors. For example, if a vulnerable component is associated with high
mitigation cost but it is highly likely to be victimized, then it deserves high priority to be
protected. Performing effective mission-aware vulnerability assessment plays a
fundamentally important role for the massive deployment of CPSs. This framework
outlines the work-in-progress towards this direction, where various formal method-based
approaches have been systematically integrated to develop an effective solution. Future
work will develop solutions to the aforementioned open challenges.
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